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In this report I will refer to several notable recent activities of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter 'Inter-American Commission' or
'Commission' or 'IACHR'). Of special significance is the appointment on 21 July 2008
of Catalina Botero Marino, a Colombian human rights expert, as Special Rapporteur
for Freedom of Expression. Since 2005, Ms Botero has worked as an Auxiliary
Magistrate in the Constitutional Court of Colombia and is a founding member of
a prestigious Colombian non-governmental organisation, De Justicia. She has also
distinguished herself with an outstanding professional career in the academic field
and in the Office of the People's Defender of Colombia. The IACHR indicated it gave
particular consideration to her extensive knowledge about the right to freedom of
expression as well her strategic vision and work plan for the Office of the Special
Rapporteur. Ms Botero will act as a full time independent Rapporteur responsible for
safeguarding the protection and promotion of freedom of thought and expression in
the region. It is worth mentioning that the seven Commissioners of the IACHR are
elected by the OAS General Assembly to fill non-paid part-time positions. The Special
Rapporteur is the only Commission Rapporteur with a full-time appointment.

1.

THE 'RETURN DIRECTIVE' OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT

A unique development in the Commission's practice is its recent press release 03/08
of 25 July 2008, regarding the European Union's 'Return Directive'.' The Commission
indicated its concern with the Directive adopted by the European Parliament on
18 June 2008 due to the absence of sufficient safeguards that could guarantee respect
for the rights of migrants. The most draconian provisions of the Directive allow
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States to hold illegal immigrants for six months, extendable by another 12 months in
certain cases, and allow children, whose only crime is residence without the required
documents, to be held in detention camps until their deportation. Recalling basic
principles of international law including the obligation not to return persons at risk
of persecution in their home countries, the obligation to put in place safeguards to
protect individuals eligible to seek asylum, the prohibition to detain persons unless
in exceptional circumstances and as briefly as possible, and the obligation to provide
special guarantee to migrants in a vulnerable condition, the Commission exhorted
the Parliament and Council of the European Union, as well as member States, to
modify the 'Return Directive' to bring it into conformity with international human
rights standards for the protection of migrants.
The European Union 'Return Directive' was the result of a long-debated
compromise between State parties. No extreme position was thus embodied in the
Directive. Certain political groups such as the Green party still rejected the Directive
as they believed it failed to grant adequate protections to immigrants. Alternatively,
the United Kingdom, which allows unlimited periods of detention, opted out of the
Directive because it imposed a much stricter standard than its domestic law.
The IACHR concerns about the Directive are shared by NGOs such as Amnesty
International. 2 The Commission addressed the 6-12 month detention period by
emphasising that States should only detain a person in exceptional circumstances
and for a brief period of time. Likewise, Amnesty International claimed that this
period was excessive and disproportionate.' This issue indeed appears to be the most
detrimental to the protection of migrants' human rights.
The Commission also showed concern for the lack of protection given to migrants
in special and vulnerable situations, such as children. In the same vein, Amnesty
International argued that the Directive lacked sufficient guarantees for unaccompanied
children.
The Commission further underscored the international obligations of all States not
to return persons at risk of persecution in their home countries. This non-refoulement
principle is deeply grounded in the legal culture of most European States and is
supported by the lengthy case-law of the European Court on Human Rights. The
Directive fully recognises this principle. However, this principle may be in jeopardy,
since in the future the European Parliament, jointly with the Council, will decide
which countries are deemed 'safe' for purposes of asylum. One may be concerned
about the effectiveness and lawfulness of deferring such a task to a legislative body.
Hopefully, the European legislative institutions will use this power with wise discretion
and allow necessary case-by-case determinations.
2

3
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It is important to note that the Directive includes a 'most favourable clause', in
other words, States may not invoke the Directive to lower any existing protection
standards already in domestic law. Domestic law nonetheless can be modified to
adopt the more stringent standards of the Directive, defeating the purpose of the
aforementioned clause.
In sum, while the Directive provides European States with what they believed are
very needed tools to tackle the immigration problem in Europe, it raises significant
questions under existing international human rights law. From a practical perspective,
it may also worsen the already precarious situation of migrants in Europe. The
Commission and the Inter-American Court have themselves applied more protective
standards regarding American States. This creates a reasonable expectation of similar
protection of migrants from the Americas in the European region. Furthermore,
while this action by the Commission resembles the 'spousal' of international claims
for injury of aliens, it is now adopting a new contemporary modality of 'diplomatic
protection,' involving regions of the world and not only States.

2.

IACHR CONDEMNS THE EXECUTION OF JOSE
ERNESTO MEDELLIN AND HELIBERTO CHI ACEITUNO

On 6 August 2008, the Inter-American Commission issued a press release condemning
the judicial execution by the United States of the Mexican Citizen Jose Ernesto
Medellin, in contempt of the precautionary measures the IACHR granted in his
favour on 6 December 2006, based on the recommendations of its report on the merits,
dated 24 July 2008. The report stated that the United States violated Articles I (right
to life), XVIII (right to a fair trail) and XXVI (due process of law) of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The IACHR also determined that under
Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Mr Medellin's right
to consular notification and assistance had been violated. The Commission deplored
the United States' failure to recognise the Commission's request to vacate the death
penalty imposed on Mr Medellin and to hold a new trial.
Moreover, on 8 August 2008, the IACHR condemned the judicial execution by
the United States of the Honduran citizen Heliberto Chi Aceituno in defiance of the
precautionary measures the Commission granted in his favour. Mr Chi Aceituno
alleged violations of due process since he had not been informed of his right to consular
assistance. Despite the IACHR request to preserve the life and physical integrity of the
beneficiary pending the Commission's decision on the merits of the case, Mr Chi was
executed on 7 August 2008. The Commission opined that the United States' failure
to protect a condemned prisoner's life pending review of his petition contravenes its
international legal obligations by undermining the effectiveness of the Commission's
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procedures thus depriving condemned persons of their right to petition before the
IACHR system.
It is to be noted that the International Court of Justice found the United States
in violation Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in 2004.4
The Court stated that in the case of violations of the Vienna Convention, the United
States should provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of
the sentence. The US Supreme Court in Medellin5 indicated that legislative action
would be necessary to compel the state of Texas to comply with such international
judgements. The US Congress has not yet acted in this regard. On 5 August 2008,
the US Supreme Court declined to order a last minute stay in the Medellin Case, 6
disregarding the Provisional Measures issued by the International Court of Justice
(ICJ). 7Justice Breyer stated in his dissenting opinion that the execution of Mr Medellin
'will place this Nation in violation of international law'.8

3.

INDIVIDUAL CASES DECIDED BY THE COMMISSION

Dudley Stokes vs Jamaica,Case 12.468, Report No. 23/08, 14 March 2008
On 14 January 2004, a petition was filed against the State of Jamaica on behalf of Mr
Dudley Stokes alleging violation of Article 13 (freedom and thought and expression)
of the American Convention on Human Rights.
On 17 September 1987, Mr Dudley Stokes, Editor-in-Chief of three important
newspapers owned by the Gleaner Company published in Star (one of these 3
newspapers) a news report referring to an investigation conducted by the United
States federal authorities with regard to kickbacks allegedly paid by American firms
to Jamaican State Officials, including Mr Eric Abrahams while he served as Jamaican
Minister of Tourism. The news report was reprinted a second time in Daily Gleaner
on 19 September 1987. Mr Abrahams filed a claim before the Supreme Court against
the Gleaner Company and Mr Strokes alleging the news reports were libellous. On
17 July 1996, the Jamaican Supreme Court ordered the defendants to pay the sum of
Jamaican Doller 80.7 million in compensatory damages to Mr Abrahams. On 31 July
2000, the Court of Appeal of Jamaica issued a judgement reducing the amount of
compensatory damages to JD 35 million. And on 14 July 2003, the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council issued an order affirming the judgement of the Court of Appeal of
4
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Jamaica. The Commission approved Report No. 65/04 declaring this case admissible
on 14 October 2004.
The petitioner first contended that the State of Jamaica violated Article 13 of the
American Convention to the detriment of Mr Stokes on the ground that the amount of
damages awarded restricts the right to freedom of expression to a greater extent than
is necessary because it is not a proportionate punishment and is not closely tailored to
the accomplishment of a legitimate aim.
The petitioner subsequently argued that the finding of liability for the reproduction
of information supplied by a third party has a chilling effect on the right to freedom
of expression, and encourages self-censorship by journalists and editors. It was
also alleged by the petitioner that in the legal proceedings leading to the award of
damages to Mr Abrahams, the Jamaican courts failed to apply the 'actual malice' test,
namely to prove that in disseminating the news story the journalist had the specific
intent to inflict harm, was fully aware that the news was false, or acted with gross
negligence in efforts to determine the truth. Finally, petitioner maintained that the
damages awarded against Mr Stokes are disproportionate and of such character that
they undermine the interest and the right of the Jamaican populace to be informed of
actions of their public officials.
The State indicated that neither Article 13(2) nor 13(3) mentioned damages award
as a factor in limiting freedom of expression and that the award of damages by an
independent and impartial court cannot constitute a violation of Article 13(3) of the
Convention. The State also asserted that the damages awarded against Mr Stokes, albeit
very high, were proportional to the particular circumstances. Addressing petitioner's
claim concerning the 'actual malice' standard, the State contended that it was not
incorporated into Article 13 of the Convention and was therefore not binding. The
State further argued that there is no standard in the American Convention requiring
the adoption of laws that exempt a journalistic medium from liability because it
reproduces information published in another medium.
The Commission reiterated that freedom of expression is not an absolute right and
that Article 13(2) indicates the possibility of establishing restrictions such as 'respect
for the rights or reputation of other' provided these restrictions are not stricter than
necessary. The Commission also indicated that statements concerning individuals
who exercise functions of a public nature should be accorded certain latitude as it is
an essential element of a truly democratic society. The Commission found that Article
13(2) requirements that the restriction should be provided by law with the aim of
protecting the honour and reputation of other individuals were satisfied in the present
case.
With respect to the question whether the restriction was necessary, the
Commission considered that the determination of liability, not having been contested
by the petitioner, should only assess the question whether the damages awarded
were more than necessary to compensate Mr Abrahams. The Commission noted
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that the jury was given standard instruction to determine the quantum grounded on
'reasonableness and proportionality' and that it is incumbent on domestic courts to
assess the numerous factors required for evaluation. Given that there were no reported
procedural irregularities in the evaluation and that Mr Strokes had reasonable access
to domestic courts to challenge the Court's determination of civil damages, the
Commission considered that the Jamaican domestic courts effectively applied existing
standards that took into account the principle of proportionality. The Commission
further reaffirmed that the issue of whether the grounds given in a decision are
adequate and sufficient is one to be decided in the initial stages of litigation within the
domestic jurisdiction of each State.
The Commission thus concluded that the State of Jamaica did not violate the right
to freedom of thought and expression enshrined in Article 13 in relation to Article
1(1) of the American Convention.
Leydi Dayan Sanchez vs Colombia, Case 12.009, Report No. 43/08, 23 July 2008
On 12 May 1998, a petition was filed on behalf of Leydi Dayin Sdnchez and her family
against the State of Colombia. It alleged that State agents were responsible for the
death of the 14-year old girl, Leydi Dayin, in March 1998 in Barrio El Triunfo, BogotA,
Colombia, which violated Article 4 (right to life), Article 8 (right to a fair trial), Article
25 (right to a judicial protection), Article 19 (right of the child) and Article 1(1)
(obligation to protect and to ensure the rights enshrined in the Convention) of the
American Convention on Human Rights.
On 21 March 1998, Leydi Daydin, her younger brother and two friends were sitting
in the street when a vehicle and motorcycle carrying two armed men appeared.
Thinking they were militias, the children started running away. On the same day,
the district police had been informed that 15 armed youth had been seen in the
neighbourhood. When the police arrived, they saw people running, including Leydi
DayAn and her friends, and pursued them. In their pursuit, the police patrols shot
Leydi DayAn in the head. The child subsequently died from her injury after she was
brought to the hospital. On 6 July 2000, in a trial before a military court, police officer
Juan Bernado Tulcan Vallejos was acquitted of the charge of negligent homicide. On
15 May 2001, the Superior Military Tribunal confirmed the acquittal. The case was
opened by the Commission on 9 October 2002 and was declared admissible in Report
43/02.
Article 4 and 19
The petitioners argued that the State was responsible for the death of Leydi DayAn
because its agents, the law enforcement officers caused her death, and because the facts
were never fully reviewed in the judicial proceedings, thus violating Article 4 (right
to life). The petitioners further alleged that the State is also responsible for violating
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Article 19 (rights of the child), since it failed to take appropriate measures to safeguard
the victim, a minor, against the disproportionate response of agents of the State.
The Commission underscored the importance of the right to life and the corollary
duty of States to prevent situations that could lead, by action or omission, to the
infringement of the right. The Commission also stressed that Article 19 requires
the State to grant special protection to children, an obligation that goes beyond the
general obligation enshrined in Article 1(1). Citing the UN Code of Conduct for
Law Enforcement Officials, the Commission recalled that the use of force by law
enforcement officials in the course of duty must be necessary and proportionate to
the ends. The Commission further stressed that the Code expressly states that special
efforts should be made to exclude the use of firearms against children.
The Commission thus concluded that the Colombian State did not respect the right
to life of Leydi Dayin, as the agents it authorised to use force did not strictly comply
with the international standards on necessity, exceptionality and proportionality
regarding the use of that force.
The Commission also held that the State was responsible for violating Article 4
since it did not act with due diligence in investigating the events, and prosecuting and
punishing those responsible. The Commission concluded that the means undertaken
by the State of Colombia to determine the criminal responsibility of the agent involved
in the minor's death and to punish him failed to be adequate and effective.
Article 8 and 25
Furthermore, the petitioners submitted that the use of military jurisdiction
constitutes a violation of the right to fair trial (Article 8), since there is no guarantee
of independence and impartiality under that tribunal. Jurisdiction was found under
the Ministry of Defense and the Executive Branch rather than under the Judicial
Branch. The petitioners also argued that the investigation undertaken to clarify the
circumstances of the death of Leydi Daydn was arbitrary, since a large part of the
evidence produced was not taken into account and because the courts refused to order
the gathering of evidence that would have been decisive in clarifying the events. This
refusal to act resulted in the denial of justice, both procedurally and substantively.
According to the petitioners, these failures resulted in the violation of Articles 8 and
25 (right to judicial protection) in conjunction with the general obligation to respect
and ensure enshrined in Article 1(1).
The State argued that military criminal courts provided appropriate and effective
means to administer justice in this case. It also contended that the decisions regarding
the acquittal of the police officer were based on the principle of in dubio pro neo as
there were continuing doubts as to who fired the shot that killed the minor Leydi
DayAn and could not be interpreted as a sign of impunity. Addressing the petitioners'
submission concerning the denial of justice, the State reported that the preliminary
investigation of police official Juan Bernado Tulcin Vallejo had been ordered by the
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District Procurator of BogotA and that charges were filed against him. The Procurator
Delegate for the National Police however declared the charges null and void on the
basis of an incomplete determination of the conduct in question.
Citingprevious decisions, the Commission notedthat given its nature and structure,
the military criminal justice system does not meet the standard of independence
and impartiality set in Article 8(1) of the American Convention. Consequently, the
Commission reasoned that entrusting the military criminal justice system with the
investigation of the involvement of police officials in the circumstances surrounding
the death of Leydi DayAn violated the principles of a hearing before a competent
and impartial tribunal, of due process, and of access to adequate legal remedy. The
Commission was also of the opinion that the absence of an investigation of the facts,
prosecution and sentencing by a regular court of law entailed a violation of Articles 8
and 25 of the Convention in conjunction with the general obligation to respect and to
ensure set out in Article 1(1).
Proceedingssubsequent to the adoption of report No. 5/06 pursuantto Article 50 of the
Convention
Following the adoption by the Commission on 28 February 2006 of Report 05/06
concluding that the State of Colombia was responsible for violating Article 4,8, 19, and
25 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1(1) to the detriment of Leydi DayAn
Sdnchez, the Colombian Government took a number of steps in order to comply with
the Commission's recommendations. In the light of the following efforts undertaken
by the State of Colombia, namely the initiation of the action for review in the general
jurisdiction, the acts of restoration of the memory of Leydi DayAn SAnchez, the
training of the National Police on the use of firearms in keeping with the principles
of necessity, exceptionality, and proportionality, and the payment of compensation to
the relatives of the victim, the Commission decided on 26 November 2007, not to refer
the case to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In support of this decision,
the Commission highlighted the decision of the Criminal Cassation Chamber of the
Honorable Supreme Court of Justice which admitted the case for review, overturned
the aquittals based on the conclusions of Report 05/06, and referred the proceedings
to the Office of the Prosecutor General to initiate a new investigation based on the
general jurisdiction.
The Commission recommended that an impartial and effective investigation in
the general jurisdiction with a view to prosecuting and punishing those responsible in
the death of Leydi DayAn Sanchez and compensating the victim's relatives.
Sergio Emilio CadenaAntolinezvs Colombia,Case 12.448, Report No.44/08,23 July
2008
On 22 October 2002, a petition was filed in the Inter-American Commission claiming
that the Republic of Colombia is responsible for the denial of access to an effective
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judicial remedy to determine the rights of Sergio Emilio Cadena Antolines due to
the lack of compliance with a judgement handed down by the Constitutional Court.
On 24 February 2004, the Commission declared the case admissible in its Report
01/04 on the basis that Articles 8(1) and 25 had been violated. However at the merits
stage, the petitioners also requested the Commission to find the State responsible for
the violation of the right to property (Article 21) and for failing to enact domestic
provisions to bring into effect the rights protected in the Convention, with prejudice
to the victims.
Mr Sergio Emilio Cadena Antolinez was an employee of the Banco de la Repdblica
and was dismissed without just cause. At the time of the dismissal, Mr Cardena
Antolinez was protected by a collective bargaining agreement that established the
obligation of the Banco de la Reptiblica to provide a retirement pension to those
employees wrongfully dismissed. After the issue was considered by the 2 0 th Labor
Court of BogotA Circuit and the Superior Court of the Judicial District of BogotA, the
Supreme Court found in favour of the Banco de la Repiblica and dismissed all the
plaintiff's claims. Mr Cadena Antolinez's acci6n de tutela (a special injunctive remedy
or 'amparo') before the Jurisdictional Disciplinary Court of the Judiciary Council of
Cundinamarca was denied. On 13 November 2001, the Constitutional Court reversed
the Jurisdictional Court of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, quashed the decision
of the Labor Chamber of Cassation, and ordered that Mr Cadena Antolinez's rights
to due process and equal treatment be protected. Despite the Constitutional Court's
ruling, the Labor Chamber of Cassation decided to uphold the original judgement.
On 17 February 2004, the Constitutional Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering
the Banco de la Repablicato comply with its decision.
The petitioners submitted that the State failed to comply with its obligation to
guarantee effective judicial protection when it did not ensure the effectiveness of, and
compliance with, the domestic decision within a reasonable term, and when it did
not carry out a full, impartial, and effective investigation pursuant to the provision of
Articles 8 and 25. The State, in turn, claimed that there has been no violation of said
rights and guarantees given that the tutela petition lodged by Mr Cadena Antolinez
was ruled in his favour and eventually led to the effectiveness (vindication) ofhis claim.
Noting that from the beginning of the judicial process until the proper disbursement
of the payment, eight years went by and that this delay was attributable to the conflict
of jurisdiction and ruling of the high courts (known as the 'train crash' effect), the
Commission reasoned that, under these circumstances, the lodging of an action for a
prompt and simple remedy such as the tutela petition under Colombian law does not
result in the protection of fundamental rights and constitutes therefore a violation of
Article 25 in connection with Article 1(1). The Commission nonetheless considered
that, given the features of the case, it was not appropriate, in the light of Article 8, to
examine State responsibility for the alleged omission to investigate the conduct of
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the judicial officers involved in the interpretation of substantive norms, and judicial
actions.
The petitioners further maintained that Article 25 is closely linked to Article
1(1), which assigns the duty to States to design and embody in legislation an effective
recourse and to ensure the due application of domestic law by its authorities. In this
respect, the petitioner alleged that the State of Colombia failed to adopt as part of its
domestic law, pursuant to Article 2 of the Convention, legislative and administrative
measures, through statutory law to make the judgement of the Constitutional Court
enforceable. The State affirmed that Article 86 of the Constitution has sufficient
provisions for the tutela to be an effective tool for the protection of fundamental rights
and that it is materially not possible to regulate fundamental rights by a statutory law.
The Commission was of the opinion that the failure to comply with these obligations
did not necessarily occur because of a legislative deficiency. Consequently, in the
instant case there was no failure to comply with Article 2.
Furthermore, the Commission rejected Mr Cadena Antolinez claim that since his
right to a pension was recognised in the tutela judgement, the pension thus became
his property and consequently his right to property was violated when the Labor
Chamber of Cassation of the Supreme Court of Justice did not follow the ruling of
the Constitutional Court. Instead, the Commission found that the State had complied
with its obligation to disburse the pension payments owed to Mr Cadena Antolinez,
and that therefore there no longer existed any grounds to claim that there had been a
violation of Article 21.
Proceedingssubsequent to the adoption of Report No. 57/07pursuantto Article 50
In the light of the effort undertaken by the Colombian Government to transfer the
Commission's Report 57/07 to each judge who sits in the High Courts of the Republic
in order to prevent similar situations in the future and given the limited influence of
the government over an independent judiciary branch, the Commission decided not
to submit the case to the Court on 8 November 2007.
Recommendations
The Commission recommended the Colombian State to adopt necessary measures to
avoid future violations of the right to judicial protection enshrined in the Convention.
With respect to the non-pecuniary damage caused to Mr Cadena as a result of the
violation of his right to judicial protection, the Commission was of the opinion that
its report constituted reparation in itself.
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